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CONFRONTING THE COMMUNICATION CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION *
Roger J. Miner **

Introduction
If communication is defined as expression that is clearly
and easily understood, 1 much of the written and oral expression
of the legal profession simply fails to measure up to the
definition.

Inability to communicate afflicts all segments of

the profession and is now pervasive enough to be classified as a
crisis.

It deserves our attention because the effective

transmission of information, thoughts, ideas and knowledge is
essential to the efficient operation of our legal system.
Ineffective expression in legal discourse diminishes the service
of the bar, impedes the resolution of disputes, retards legal
progress and growth and, ultimately, undermines the rule of law.
My purpose is to examine the expressive deficiencies of lawyers
in their capacities as counselors, litigators, adjudicators,
legislators and educators.

This examination is designed to

demonstrate that communication failure is a serious and growing
problem throughout the legal profession.

It is also designed to

suggest that there is a need to clarify, simplify and edify in
all forms of legal expression.
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I.

Counselors
The minute you
something that you can't
understand, you can almost
be sure it was drawn up
by a lawyer.
WILL ROGERS 2
The attorney as c

is constrained to communicate

clients, colleagues and government agencies.

Communication with

clients -- to keep the client informed about the status of a

case; to comply with requests for information; and to provide an
explanation of matters sufficient to permit the client to make
informed decisions -- is an ethical obligation. 3
Professional Responsibil

The Code of

exhorts lawyers to "exert [their}

best efforts to insure that dee

ions of [the

] client[s] are

made only after the client[s] ha[ve] been informed of relevant
considerations." 4

Yet, failure to communicate is near the top of

the list of complaints made by clients about their lawyers. 5
Very frequently, an irreparable breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship is occasioned by a lawyer's neglect to impart
necessary information to a client clearly and promptly.
Effective counseling requires that clients

informed of

the status of negotiations being conducted on their behalf, 6 of
offers of settlement in civil matters, 7 and of proffered plea
bargains in criminal prosecutions. 8

Effective counseling also

requires that attorneys explain to their clients the nature
effect of legal instruments, 9 respond to questions bearing on the

2

legality or desirability of actions proposed and undertaken, 10
review the chances of success in litigation 11 and discuss
arrangements for the payment of reasonable fees for services
rendered. 12

In all these things, clarity of expression, written

and oral, is essential.

Unfortunately, the reports are rife with

tales of the disastrous effects that the expressive deficiencies
of counselors have had upon clients as well as upon counselors
themselves. 13

Client communication is not merely a device for

reassuring the client or avoiding fee

disp~tes;

it is the sine

gua non of the service provided by the attorney as counselor. 14
Much ink has been spilled in the effort to promote the use
of plain English by lawyers. 15

Despite all the criticism

directed at legalese, however, attorneys continue to employ
arcane legal language when counseling clients.

It is no wonder

that clients rate lawyers as ineffective communicators and,
according to surveys, generally will select one lawyer over
another on the basis of ability to communicate rather than
technical competence. 16

Professional jargon is meaningless to a

non-lawyer, and clients do not hesitate to characterize as
"gobbledegook" the opinions of counsel they are unable to
comprehend. 17

One author has formulated the following rule for

communicating with clients as well as the lay public generally:
"Lawyer-to-laity writing should be fully humanized." 18

This

excellent rule of communication should govern oral expression
also, since the counsel of legal advisers is most often sought in
the course of oral conversation.

Indeed, conversational
3

counseling often is a more effective way of advising clients,
since it is flexible,

tentative and ongoing. 19

An all-too-typical example of attorney-client communication

failure recently surf aced in a New York City newspaper report of
a pending defamation action brought by a well-known comedian.
According to the report 1 the defendant in the case, when
questioned at a deposition about his $10 million counterclaim for
services allegedly rendered under a management agreement, said:
"I don't know what it says and I don't understand it. " 20

The

immediate result of that testimony was the withdrawal of the
counterclaim, but the long-term result was to reinforce public
skepticism of the ability of lawyers to communicate.
The inarticulateness of the bar has brought us to the point

where law firms must hire public relations counsel, "media
advisers, " "image

" to speak to the public for them and to

advise them on how to deal with the press. 21

There was a time

when some people would refer to a lawyer as a "mouthpiece."

How

surprised they would be to hear a "mouthpiece" speak through
someone else!

One must wonder whether the time is far off when

an attorney will counsel clients through the medium of a
"communicator."

Nevertheless, public relations is a legitimate

institutional function of the bar.

It is recognized generally

that the erosion of public confidence in the bar has come about
largely because of a failure to communicate an understanding of
the role of lawyers in society and that much needs to be done to

educate the laity in that regarct. 22
4

The bar performs its public

relations function by providing that education. 23
The widespread use of legal jargon in discourse with clients
is sometimes attributed to bad motives on the part of the bar -escalation of fees, self-promotion and deception. 24

One

commentator has posited "[i]nertia, incompetence, status, power,
cost and risk" as "a formidable set of motivations to keep
legalese." 25

These motivations, he asserts, "lack any

intellectually or socially acceptable rationale" and "amount to
assertions of naked self-interest. " 26

My own experience has been

that only inertia and incompetence drive the excessive use of
lawyerisms and legalese in counseling clients and drafting legal
instruments.

Inertia is represented by the use of the same

forms, form books, buzz words, precedent, methods and practices
over the years.

Responses to questions and solutions of problems

tend to be the same as they were in regard to similar questions
and problems in the past.

Thus there develops in a law practice

a sameness and a resistance to change that come to have an effect
on the lawyers in a firm and their successors.
the roots of inertia spread.

In this manner,

Incompetence in expression now

permeates the profession because of deficiencies in the early
education of young lawyers.

Modern education seems to provide an

insufficient foundation in English grammar, style and usage.

As

a law teacher, I have been astounded by some of the inadequacies
in written and oral expression demonstrated by the brightest
students.

It should come as no surprise to educators that

lawyers increasingly are unable to communicate with clients.
5

S

a counselor is required to "abide by a cl.ient' s

decisions concerning the objectives of representation
[to] consult with
be pursued, " 27

. and

client as to the means by which they are to
is essential that advice as to objectives as

well as means be conveyed as plainly as possible.

The language

of counseling must be respectful of client autonomy so as to
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According to one commentator, the ideal goal is for a lawyer to
"strive to enable her client not only to know what choices await
him, but also to reach full decisionmaking capacity, and then she
should participate in her client's exercise of that capacity by
offering information, legal advice, and .
perspectives." 29

. other

Since a lawyer's advice "need not be confined

to purely legal considerations," and often implicates the
II
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it is essential that the client be made fully aware of the
distinction between legal and non-legal advice.

The level of

expression may vary, depending on the level of sophistication of
the client, but the information imparted must be full and
complete. 31

Prompt, clear and concise advice, written and oral,

not only serves the decisionmaking process, but also demonstrates
respect and concern for the client, 32 elements sometimes absent
in the contemporary attorney-client relationship.

The communication skills of those who initiate lawyer-tolawyer transmissions have been found wanting in recent years,
especially in respect of legal memoranda for internal law firm
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use.

A writer has referred to "the countless hours of expensive

legal time that must be wasted every waking day, as partners and
senior associates try to make use of .
memos. " 33

. . badly written law

Unnecessary digressions, the mixing of fact statements

with legal opinions, and lack of order in the presentation of
arguments have been identified as some of the deficiencies
found. 34

The lack of directness and excessive formalism of

expression that characterize poorly written correspondence as
well as inadequate legal memos are said to be especially apparent
among young lawyers. 35

Elimination of "incomprehensible

muddles 1136 in lawyer-to-lawyer discourse will facilitate the work
of counselors and redound to the benefit of clients.
II.

Litigators
Q.

Mr. Jones, is your appearance this
morning pursuant to a deposition notice
which I sent to your attorney?

A.

No.
Jpis is how I dress when I go to
work.

Essential to every litigator is clarity of speech in
courtroom discourse.

Yet trial judges frequently are heard to

complain of the inability of courtroom lawyers to communicate
with witnesses, juries and the bench itself.

This is indeed a

strange phenomenon in a day when trial advocacy is taught in law
schools, in continuing education programs and in books and
articles covering all aspects of the subject, from opening
statement through direct and cross-examination and closing

7

argument. 38

Lawyers are bombarded constantly with advertisements

suggesting the purchase of new books and publications designed to
improve expression in the courtroom.

A recent example:

"Trial

Communication Skills is the collaborative effort of three leading
experts in the fields of trial practice and communication.

Together, these three authors bring you a unique understanding of
interpersonal communication and its application in the
courtroom. " 39

Another:

"[The author] is uniquely qualified to

write about persuasion approaches for advocates.

The basis for

the information he presents in The Persuasion Edge has been
collected and refined through the years as he's built his
reputation in the field of communications and trial advocacy." 40
Yet another:

"Trial Excellence is a monthly newsletter, and the

only one of its kind.

Because it is exclusively about the best

and most effective communication and performance techniques
specifically for trial lawyers. 1141
The stilted language of the law has no place, of course, in
the questioning of witnesses or in the persuasion of juries.

The

question-and-answer set out at the beginning of this section
demonstrates convincingly that legal terms should be avoided if
there is to be understanding between lawyer and witness.

In my

opinion, the expressive deficiencies noted in trial lawyers are
for the most part attributable to the lack of trial experience.
At an earlier time, young litigators had the opportunity to cut
their teeth in trial advocacy by trying simple cases in courts of
limited jurisdiction.

As more experience was gained, they
8

proceeded to the trial of more complex matters, honing their
courtroom skills as they progressed.

Thus were learned the

.
.
1 essons nee d e d t o mas t er th e art an d science
o f persuasion.

~

Today, the economics of law practice make it prohibitively
expensive to litigate small claims.

The salaries paid to newly-

minted lawyers in large law firms are such that the firm cannot
afford to litigate any but the most lucrative cases. 43

Even as

to those cases, courtroom resolution is rare, and it is not
unusual to find litigation partners who never have conducted a
single trial.

As to matters where the amount in controversy is

small, clients either are relegated to some form of alternate
dispute resolution or left to their own devices in Small Claims
Courts.

Thus are experienced trial lawyers becoming an extinct

species.
Inexperienced litigators frequently have communication
problems during the direct examination of witnesses because they
are unable to pose a question that will elicit an answer relevant
and material to the case.

A question that calls for a narrative

statement and results in a rambling, incoherent mass of fact and
speculation is one example of such an expressive deficiency.
Another example is a series of questions written out in exact
sequence.

Responses that deviate from the sequence can cause

irreparable problems for the rigid questioner. 44

Another common

failing of inexperienced litigators is the inability to simplify
the testimony of their expert witnesses so that the jury might
comprehend the nature of the expert opinion. 45
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Communication

breakdowns occur also in the opening statement, when counsel
promises proof they are unable to deliver, 46 and in closing
argument, when they are carried away by their own rhetoric. 47
Inexperienced trial counsel convey to the jury the appearance of
concealment by frequent objections to evidence, 48 and a sense of
uncertainty by aimless, rambling and lengthy cross-examination of
adverse witnesses. 49

Finally, advice to clients regarding their

own testimony, which witnesses to call and what documents to
offer constitutes a selection process fraught with danger in the
hands of inexperienced counse1. 50

Apprenticeship and

specialization in trial advocacy may be the only way left to
restore communication to the trial courtroom.
As a long-time observer of the litigation scene, it seems to

(

me that the communication crisis has affected appellate advocacy
even more than trial advocacy.

Appellate advocacy comes in two

parts -- Briefs and Oral Arguments -- and its sole object is the
persuasion of appellate judges.

The Brief is the more important

part of appellate advocacy, because judges have it in hand both
before and after oral argument.

It is physically with us long

after the argument evaporates and is forgotten.

The Briefs are

the first thing I look at, even before the decision of the trial
court or any part of the Appendix or Record.

The Briefs are what

I refer to when writing an opinion or before signing off on a
colleague's opinion.

Yet in my experience it is the rare brief-

writer who seizes the opportunity to employ the clarity,
simplicity and directness of expression necessary to endow a
10

Brief with maximum persuasive force.
In the beginning of the Republic, the Brief was merely an
adjunct to unlimited oral argument. 51

The early Briefs were not

much more than a list of applicable precedents and authorities,

as they are today in England, but the oral argument proceeded at
a leisurely pace, with many questions and answers.
bulk of cases in

present~day

The sheer

appellate courts makes it impossible

to proceed in this manner now, and it therefore is most important
that the Brief serve its communication function by imparting the
facts and the law to the courts in the most persuasive manner
possible.

That function is not served by Briefs that contain the

following recurring deficiencies that I have noted in Briefs
submitted to me: excessive quotations of the record and
authorities; inaccurate citations; typographical and grammatical
errors; outdated authorities; disorganized arguments; failure to
identify and distinguish adverse precedent; lack of clarity;
prolix sentences; excessive use of adverbs; uninformative point
headings; inadequate statement of the issues presented;
incomplete factual presentation; statement of the facts through
summary of witness' testimony rather than narrative; discussion
of material outside the record; use of slang; inclusion of
sarcasm, personal attacks and other irrelevant matters; excessive
number of points; lack of reasoned argument; illogical and
unsupportable conclusions; failure to meet adversary's arguments;
unnecessary footnotes; and neglect to use the format prescribed
by Court rules. 52

Despite the availability of some excellent
11

guides to Brief writing, 53 the noted deficiencies persist and the
end of the crisis in this area is nowhere in sight.
If there is a failure of communication in brief-writing,
there is an even greater failure in the other part of appellate
advocacy

oral argument.

Although the opportunity for oral

argument has been diminished as the result of the screening
process employed by some appellate courts, 54 and the time for
argument (when it is allowed) has been greatly reduced, 55 the
privilege of speaking to an appellate court continues to be
valued by some litigators.

While litigators will engage in the

most meticulous preparations for trial, it often seems that the
same attorneys have not prepared at all for the argument of an
appeal.

Among the best oral communicators I have heard are law

students in appellate moot court competitions that I have judged.
The students express themselves effectively because they are
prepared to do so by reason of study and practice.

Real world

appellate advocates can learn a lesson from the devotion to duty
displayed by moot court advocates.

The ability to present a

structured argument and to respond to the questions of judges
within a restricted time period must be cultivated, 56 but only a
few seem interested in developing the skills of oral argument.
Deficiency in oral expression is more and more noticeable as most
litigators, ignoring the opportunity to engage in a Socratic
dialogue with the judges about their cases, approach oral
argument as if they really would have preferred to "submit. 1157
I have published twenty-five suggestions designed to assist
12

litigators in oral communication on appeal. 58

Other judges also

have undertaken to point up various deficiencies in oral
argument. 59

With judges, including Justices of the Supreme

Court, emphasizing the importance of oral argument, 60 it seems
strange that litigators should treat it so cavalierly.

Oral

argument is one of the great traditions of the Anglo-American
legal system.

It is still a pleasure to see and hear the

interchange between British barristers and the appeals court
judges before whom they argue.

That interchange is characterized

by a clarity of expression that is the envy of American appellate
judges.
III.
Adjudicators
I have decided to allow your spouse
$100 per week for temporary support.
Thank you, your Honor.
I'll p~pbably
throw in a few dollars myself.
Those who adjudicate controversies need to communicate with
various audiences.

Judges who preside at trials must express

themselves in a way that can be understood by counsel, witnesses
and the parties appearing before them.

Appellate judges must be

clear and concise in their questions during oral argument and
must render written opinions that are comprehensible as
resolutions of disputes at hand and as precedents for future
cases.

Magistrates, referees, administrative law judges,

arbitrators, special masters, examiners and all those who perform
adjudicatory functions of any kind must bring perspicuity to
13

their endeavors.
It is the duty of judges who are bound to conduct trials
under the Federal Rules of Evidence to see that adequate
information is conveyed to the jury to enable the jury to reach a
proper verdict.

Federal judges are enjoined to control the

interrogation of witnesses and the presentation of evidence in
such a way as to "make the interrogation and presentation
effective

the ascertainment of the truth." 62

To accomplish

this task, the court is authorized to call witnesses on its own
motion, 63 to interrogate witnesses by whomever called, 64 and to
appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. 65

The trial judge

in a federal court, and in many other courts, has the right and
responsibility to see that the trial is a fair one and, in doing

so, may summarize, comment upon and draw inferences from the
evidence for the benefit of the jury. 66

This is an important

communication function and one that is sometimes ignored by
judges who consider that the "adversary system" will produce
whatever "truth" is needed to enable a jury to arrive at a fair
and just verdict.

Unfortunately, as noted previously, expressive

deficiencies of litigators are not unknown, and the search for
the truth may well need some assistance from a trial judge.

Of all the communicative functions of the trial judge, jury
instruction is probably the most important and the most
difficult.

Jury comprehension studies generally confirm that

jurors do not understand many of the instructions given to
them. 67

Efforts have been undertaken to draft pattern jury

14

instructions that will be meaningful to jurors.

The problem was

put succinctly by the Federal Judicial Center's Committee to
Study Criminal Jury Instructions, in the Introduction to its 1982
Report:
The importance of communicating well
with lay jurors is widely acknowledged by
drafters of pattern instructions.
It is
nevertheless clear that most pattern
instructions do not do it very well.
It is
all too easy for the lawyers and judges who
engage in the drafting process to forget how
much of their vocabulary and language style
was acquired in law school. The principal
barrier to effective communication is
probably not the inherent complexity of the
subject matter, but our inability to put
ourselves in the rosition of those not
legally trained. 6
It is noteworthy that the Committee sought the advice of a
journalist who was not legally trained, and considered research
in juror understanding in drafting the model criminal
instructions.

Other experiments have been conducted in an effort

to improve juror comprehension, including the use of tape
recordings and the furnishing of written copies of the charge.~
Much more remains to be done but, in the final analysis, jury
comprehension of the court's instructions is the responsibility
of the judge instructing.
A judge must at all times maintain the appearance of
impartiality before the jury.

While judges have a responsibility

to ensure that issues are presented clearly and may interrogate
witnesses for that purpose, it is improper to conduct the
questioning of witnesses in such a way as to convey the judge's

15

opinion that the witness

not worthy of be.lief. 70

improper form of judicial communication.

This is an

Nonverbal conduct

demonstrating disbelief, untoward actions toward defense counsel
and improper comment on testimony may deprive a party of a fair
trial and constitute a prejudicial judicial expression. 71

Judges

must express fairness and impartiality in both speech and
demeanor when presiding at trials and that expression represents
the ultimate communication of the trial judge.
It is the written opinion in which the skills of the
adjudicator find their most perfect (or imperfect) expression.
In regard to appeals, it has been said that "[t]he integrity of
the [appellate] process requires that courts state reasons for
their decisions." 72

In point of fact, the integrity of any

adjudicatory process is promoted by reasoned opinions.

While

courts of first instance resolve controversies, appeals courts
may establish precedent in the process of resolving
controversies.

Consequently, the audiences for various judicial

opinions may be different.

According to one teacher of judicial

writing, however, adjudicators share common goals in desiring
their written opinions "to be clear, concise, precise and
complete, fair, reasonable, just, balanced and dignified" in
order to serve a number of purposes: "to decide, dispose of and
record cases; persuade, exhort, order, teach, inform, explain and
reason with audiences ranging in legal expertise from litigants
and the media to courts of appellate review." 73
indeed!
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A tall order

Although there is a need for a faster, better way to write
opinions, 74 the bar remains opposed to dispositions by summary
order or by short statements in open court, at least in regard to
appellate decisions where the dispositions cannot be cited as
precedent. 75

The bar may be right, because each decision of each

adjudicator should stand on its own and be subject to examination
by all in the great common law tradition.

While the opinions of

most adjudicators rarely will be classified as literature, even a
one page ruling on a topic as arcane as trademarks can sparkle
with its clarity and brevity. 76

More than any other writer, the

adjudicator must heed the elementary principles of composition, 77
because a "judicial opinion in what may seem an ordinary case,
phrased in language that expresses an honest and genuine passion
for social order and justice, may be remembered, at least by
those affected, long after the popular play or novel has run its
course." 78

As a communicator, the adjudicator can do no better

than to remember Justice Cardozo's admonition that the "sovereign
virtue for the judge is clearness. " 79

IV.
Legislators
That one hundred and fifty lawyers should do
business together ought not to be expected.
Thomas Jefferson (on the U.S. Congress) 80
Those in the legal profession whose responsibility it is to
formulate and draft legislation often are faulted for fuzziness
of language.

Indeed, every lawyer has had to wrestle, at one
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time or another, with statutes, especially of the tax variety,
that are tantamount to incomprehensible.

Yet we are told by a

legislative lawyer:
If bills suffer from any of what Professor
Dickerson has labeled the "diseases of
language; ambiguity, overvagueness,
overprecision, overgenerality or
undergenerality," they do so either by
intent, in the case of a planned vagueness,
or as a result of what Justice Frankfurter
and others have characterized, somewhat
exaggeratedly, as the inexact nature of
words.
Only infr~fluently is an enacted bill
sloppily drafted.
We are told by the same author that much legislation is the
product of compromises, of the process of majority building and
of problems of foreseeability. 82

Finally, we are instructed,

with just cause, that courts should exercise more self-restraint
in statutory interpretation and that legislative history is not a
very good indicator of legislative intent. 83
It seems beyond cavil that legislative bodies know what
plain English is.

Many states have adopted laws requiring the

use of plain English in consumer contracts, insurance policies
and similar documents; Congress itself has adopted a number of
statutes containing plain English requirements. 84

The New York

law establishing "Requirements for use of plain language in
consumer transactions" is a paradigm.
defined agreements to be "l.

It simply requires certain

Written in a clear and coherent

manner using words with common and everyday meanings; 2.
Appropriately divided and captioned by its various section. 1185
The statute has the beauty of simplicity 86 and, while it must be
18

conceded that the constraints of the legislative process
generally do not permit laws to be written in this manner, the
contrast with most legislation is stark. Perhaps there is a
middle ground.
Legislatures cannot have it both ways.

They cannot write

vague, complex and difficult statutes and complain that the
courts don't interpret them properly or don't exercise sufficient
"restraint."

Courts are faced daily with actual cases and

controversies involving real-life people whose disputes must be
resolved.

They cannot refer those disputes to committees or

commissions for study and for report at some day far in the
future.

Courts must do the best they can with what they have,

including legislative history and attempts to "divine" the
legislative intent.

Some legislative bodies themselves have

provided rules, albeit contradictory at times, for the
interpretation of their statutes. 87

More guidance for the courts

is required in order that both branches may perform the roles
assigned to them. 88
Despite all the legislative constraints, it can be said that
legislator-lawyers have, by attention to plain language laws
affecting consumers, recognized the depth of the communication
crisis more than any other branch of the profession. 89

We can

only hope that this concern for plain language will extend to
other types of legislation as well.

In this connection, it is

heartening to note that a recent seminar sponsored by the Indiana
University Institute for Legal Drafting and held in conjunction

(

19

with the National Conference of State Legislatures, attracted
fifty-seven legislative draftsmen from twenty states, American
Samoa and the Virgin Islands.

The Director of the Institute

"stated that the goal of the seminar was to provide professional
draftsmen with the tools to produce understandable and readable
versions of what the legislature wants. " 90

v.
Educators
Everywhere I go I'm asked if I think the
university stifles writers. My opinion is
that they don't stifle enough of them.
Flannery O'Connor 91
Law students comprise the primary audience for legal
educators.

The secondary audience is comprised of the practicing

bar, other academics and the general public, including those
interested in the books and learned articles of law professors.
There is evidence of a growing estrangement between the
professors and their primary audience.

Law teachers are becoming

less interested in teaching professional skills and professional
subjects than in interdisciplinary studies and other academic
pursuits. 92

According to a recent newspaper dispatch, "many law

professors are paying less attention to the legal doctrines that
occupy the thoughts of most practicing lawyers and judges, and
instead are turning to more abstract disciplines like economics
and political theory. "93

Included in the dispatch is a reference

to a law professor who is described as "one of the most soughtafter legal academics in the country" by reason of his expertise
20

in dispute management in Medieval Icelandic society. 94
The changing focus of academics, from doctrinal scholarship
to interdisciplinary studies, promises serious consequences for
the legal profession.

Academics are communicating more with each

other and less with their students or the profession of which
they are such an important part. 95

The upshot is that new

lawyers are less-equipped to handle the demands of modern law
practice than those of a previous generation.

With legal

education "schizophrenic" and law faculties "factionalized, 1196
the profession suffers.
But even more serious than the failure of the professors to
communicate with their students is their failure to teach
communication.

Teachers of legal writing courses do not receive

the academic recognition they deserve, and the poor writing
skills of graduate lawyers are the immediate consequence. 97
Academics compete for space in the law reviews, 98 but little
attention is given to student writing.

With academic tenure,

promotion and status dependent on publishing, 99 professors turn
the bulk of their attention to writing rather than teaching.
Thus do law students fail to obtain the oral and written skills
of expression necessary for the survival of the profession.
Language is, after all, the medium in which the profession
conducts its business. 100
Moreover, many academics, by virtue of their disdain of law
practice, have succeeded only in imbuing their students with the
ability to express themselves in professional jargon without

21

communicating the human voice of the law. 101

Academics are not

exempt from the disease of legalese and of ten add confusion and
uncertainty to the law by introducing new legal theories that
have no relation to the real world. 102
Judge Harry T. Edwards, my colleague on the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and a former law
professor himself, has said that "the profession can no longer
afford the curriculum of law schools [to be] isolated in a world
of its own." 103

It is time once again to reexamine legal

education in the public interest.

Proposals for apprenticeship

training beyond law school should be examined. 104

If law

educators continue to be of the opinion that law schools do not
have a mission to prepare students for the practice of law, then

(

post-graduate training may be the only alternative. lOS

A remedy

must be found for the deficient communication of legal knowledge
and skills.
CONCLUSION
The various branches of the legal profession perform their
work through the media of written and oral expression.
Communication, defined as expression clearly and easily
understood, therefore is essential to the effective functioning
of the bar and, ultimately, to the maintenance of our legal
system and the perpetuation of the rule of law.

The bar is

constrained to communicate with such diverse audiences as
clients, colleagues, judges, witnesses, juries, administrative
bodies, law students, academicians and the public at large.
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Of

the deterioration of the abilities of lawyers -- counselors,
litigators, adjudicators, legislators and educators -- to
communicate with these audiences, there can be no doubt.

It

seems to me that the deterioration now has reached the level of a
crisis that must be confronted.

Until the crisis engages the

attention of the legal profession, however, the process of
confrontation cannot begin.

It is my hope that this presentation

will serve to focus some attention on the critical problems of
legal communication.
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